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I. INTRODUCTION
Because of the monopoly they convey to owners of useful
inventions, patents often stir controversy. This has given rise to calls
for patent reform to mitigate their adverse effects.
1
Sometimes these
calls go to the extreme, where scholars take the position that patents
should be abolished.
2
Recently, at the start of the millennium, a new
wave of scholarly literature on patent abolitionism has appeared.
3
This
literature echoes the strong anti-patent sympathies that existed in
Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century.
4
In reality,
however, these debates are almost entirely theoretical. No country has
1. See generally F.M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform
in the United States, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 167 (2009) (discussing
important legislative, judicial, and diplomatic initiatives designed to strengthen
patent enforcement systems domestically and abroad).
2. See generallyMark Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 899,
925 (2002) (discussing the debate among scholars regarding the abolition of the
patent system: specifically, alleged defects in the judicial administration of the
patent system, philosophical justifications, and free trade arguments).
3. See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE:
HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008)
(presenting empirical evidence to suggest that the patent system is broken and in
need of comprehensive reform); MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST
INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (2008) (arguing that intellectual property law
concerning copyright and patent constitutes a government grant of a costly and
dangerous private monopoly over ideas); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER,
INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004)
(suggesting a three-pronged solution for restoring the patent system: “create
incentives to motivate parties who have information about the novelty of a patent;
provide multiple levels of patent review; and replace juries with judges and special
masters to preside over certain aspects of infringement cases.”); Michele Boldrin &
David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2013) (arguing
that there is no empirical evidence to show that patents increase innovation and
productivity); Liliane Hilaire-Pérez et al., Innovation Without Patents: An
Introduction, 64 REVUE ÉCONOMIQUE 1 (2013) (providing a preface to an entire
special issue on the topic of innovation without patents); William Kingston,
Innovation Needs Patents Reform, 30 RES. POL’Y 403 (2001) (arguing that the
current patent system fails to deliver adequate protection due to its inability to
address the behavior of many “commercially valuable, cutting-edge intellectual
creations.”); see also Richard Stallman, Patent Law Is, at Best, Not Worth Keeping,
45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 389 (2013) (rebutting arguments in favor of keeping the patent
system and ultimately concluding that patent law should be abolished).
4. Janis, supra note 2, at 922 (providing a historical overview of the nineteenth
century patent abolitionist movement in England).
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ever gone so far as to actually eliminate patents, with one notable
exception.
The one and only country ever to abandon patents was the
Netherlands.
5
In 1869, the Dutch terminated their patent system and
stopped issuing patents until 1912, when the patent system was
restored.
6
The unique and unprecedented case of the Netherlands is
often mentioned or briefly discussed in the literature on patent
abolition.
7
Yet, scholars give different explanations of what precisely
motivated the Dutch government to take the radical step of eliminating
patents, as opposed to governments in other countries that witnessed
similar anti-patent sympathies around the same period.
8
Machlup & Penrose, for example, suggest that the free-trade
movement—which purports to eliminate artificial restrictions upon
commerce, including patents—was particularly strong in the
Netherlands.
9
Yet, there is no evidence that this movement was
stronger in the Netherlands than, for example, in Great Britain or
elsewhere in Europe.
10
5. See, e.g., ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL PATENTS:
THE NETHERLANDS, 1869-1912; SWITZERLAND, 1850-1907 14 (1971) (discussing
how Switzerland is another industrial country that is often presented as a direct
accomplice of the nineteenth-century anti-patent movement, alongside the
Netherlands. However, a key difference with the Netherlands is that Switzerland had
no patent law at the time and repeatedly opposed the adoption of patent legislation.
Accordingly, Switzerland never abolished patents, but simply did not enact patent
legislation. From a legislative viewpoint, this requires an entirely different (and
arguably less contentious) decision to be taken by the legislator).
6. Id.
7. See generally ROBERT ANDREW MACFIE, RECENT DISCUSSIONS ON THE
ABOLITION OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE,
GERMANY, AND THE NETHERLANDS (London, Longmans et al. 1869) (presenting a
collection of arguments in favor of abolishing the present patent system, reasoning,
for example that the present system “gives the minimum advantage to the inventor,
and inflicts the maximum disadvantage on the public.”).
8. See generally id. (presenting a nice overview of the anti-patent movement in
Europe in those days).
9. Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth
Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 5 (1950).
10. See GEORGE ARMITAGE-SMITH, THE FREE TRADE MOVEMENT AND ITS
RESULTS 9, 145-46 (London, Blackie & Son 1898) (stating that free-trade policywas
essentially confined to the British Isles, although it was also followed in countries
such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway).
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They further contend that the Dutch were unconvinced that patent
law could be reformed in such a way as to produce satisfactory
outcomes for all parties concerned.
11
This is true, but only partially.
Patent abolitionists indeed were “thoroughly persuaded that a good
law of patents is an impossibility,”
12
but the Dutch government was
well aware of examples of foreign patent laws that could cure several
deficiencies of the Patent Act of 1817, which was enacted in the
Netherlands at the time.
13
A third—more populist—argument advanced to explain the patent
abolition is that Dutch industries in the nineteenth century had fallen
behind and that patents were removed to enhance industrial progress
by allowing the industries to freely use foreign inventions and
technologies.
14
The Netherlands at the time was in a somewhat lesser
state of industrial development than neighbouring countries,
15
but it
seems rather unlikely that this alone would justify patent abolition.
Arguably, the Netherlands was not in such dire straits that it would
11. Machlup & Penrose, supra note 9, at 5.
12. Verslag der Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-General,
Afschaffing van het Verleenen van Uitsluitende Regten op Uitvindingen en
Verbeteringen van Kunst en Volksvlijt, Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1868/69
II, 1471 (Neth.) [hereinafter Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill]
(Godefroi).
13. Wet Omtrent het Verleenen van Uitsluitende Regten op Uitvindingen en
Verbeteringen van Voorwerpen van Kunst en Volksvlijt, Stb. 1817, 6 (Neth.)
[hereinafter Patent Act of 1817].
14. FRITS GERZON, NEDERLAND, EEN VOLK VAN STRUIKROVERS? DE
HERINVOERING VAN DE NEDERLANDSE OCTROOIWET (1869-1912) 6–8 (1986);
TH.C.J.A. VAN ENGELEN, PRESTATIEBESCHERMING EN ONGESCHREVEN
INTELLECTUELE EIGENDOMSRECHTEN 152 (1994).
15. I. J. BRUGMANS, PAARDENKRACHT EN MENSENKRACHT: SOCIAAL-
ECONOMISCHE GESCHIEDENIS VAN NEDERLAND 1795–1940 83 (1961) (discussing
that only after 1860 industrialization in the Netherlands began to set in. Compared
with Belgium, which in 1844 had 1,448 steam engines in operation with a total of
37,400 Hp., the industries in the Netherlands only ran seventy-two steam engines
with a total of 1,120 Hp. in 1837, and 392 steam engines with a total of 7,193 Hp. in
1853); JANAART DE JONGE, DE INDUSTRIALISATIE IN NEDERLAND TUSSEN 1850 EN
1914 176, 495 (1976) (finding that the number of steam engines for industrial use in
the Netherlands would grow to 1,815 with a total of 21,403 Hp. in 1872, and 3,519
with a total of 44,603 Hp. in 1883. Between 1853 and 1872, the increased steam
engine capacity was used mostly for the food processing and textile industries, and
between 1872 and 1883 for the manufacture of bricks, tiles, pottery, glassware,
wood, and metal industries).
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risk getting isolated internationally by courageously abolishing
patents only with a view to boost their own national economy.
In practice, the circumstances under which the Dutch patent
abolition occurred must have been much more complex. This paper
asserts that the decision to eliminate patents can only be explained
through a combination of different legal, economic, practical, and
political factors, which has not been integrally discussed in literature
so far.
This paper, therefore, investigates which joint factors led to the
abolition of patents in the Netherlands in 1869.
16
To enable a full
understanding of the dynamics behind the Patent Abolition Act, it first
gives a brief overview of nineteenth-century Dutch patent law (Part II)
and sets out the deficiencies of the Patent Act of 1817 (Part III).
Then the paper describes how, from the mid-nineteenth century
onwards, these deficiencies elicited calls for patent reform from the
industries and scholars (Part IV). It is in these debates that propositions
to abolish patents were first made. Unlike other writings on the topic,
this paper will not systematically cluster the arguments in favour and
against patents under specific headings,
17
as the objective is not to
outweigh the arguments put forward by both sides. Instead, it
examines from where the calls for patent reform originated and what
the different groups actually called for: a revision of patent law or its
abolition.
18
For this purpose, the paper separates industry reports from
16. Accordingly, this paper neither assesses the effects and implications of the
patent abolition on industrial development in the Netherlands, nor examines the
reasons for reintroducing patent law in 1912. See generally GERZON, supra note 14,
at 31-113; SCHIFF, supra note 5, at 17-82; Petra Moser, How Do Patent Laws
Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World’s Fairs, 95 AM.
ECON. REV. 1214 (2005) (discussing how, for example, the share of Dutch
innovations in food processing increased from eleven to thirty-seven percent after
the Netherlands abolished the patent system in 1869).
17. Machlup & Penrose, supra note 9, at 10-28 (portraying the discussions by
representing the four main arguments used by patent advocates to justify patent
protection and challenged by opponents of the patent system); see also D. den
Hertog, De Anti-octrooibewegingen in Nederland (1850-1886), 44 BIJBLAD BIJ DE
INDUSTRIËLEEIGENDOM 27, 30–35 (1976); H. I. DUTTON, THEPATENTSYSTEM AND
INVENTIVEACTIVITYDURING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, 1750-1852 17 (1984);
GERZON, supra note 14, at 9-29.
18. See ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM
GUTENBERG TOGATES 247–89 (2009) (displaying a similar approach).
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academic writings on the patent issue in those days. As will be seen,
both the industries and scholars had patent revisionists and abolitionist
amongst them, some of which had much political influence.
Subsequently, the paper explores how politics responded to the calls
for patent reform (Part V). It will demonstrate that the choice between
revising the law and abolishing patents was not so easy and that it took
long before the Dutch government came to a resolution. The result is
known: a bill was presented to terminate patents. To identify what
motivated the government to propose the bill and what considerations
prompted Parliament to adopt it, the paper delves into the preparatory
legislative materials and parliamentary history to expose the legal,
economic, practical, and political considerations behind it (Part VI).
Part VII concludes and puts the findings in a broader, contemporary
perspective.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF NINETEENTH-
CENTURY DUTCH PATENT LEGISLATION
As in most other European countries, from the sixteenth until the
end of the eighteenth century, invention protection in the Netherlands
was contingent on privileges granted by local or state authorities.
19
The privilege systemwas abolished after the French army had invaded
and occupied the Netherlands in 1795 and brought with it the liberal
ideals of the French Revolution.
20
In 1809, under the reign of King
Louis Napoleon, the first patent law of the Netherlands was
established,
21
but already in 1810, when the Dutch territory was
annexed into the First French Empire, this law was replaced by the
French patent decrees of 1791.
22
19. See generally GERARD DOORMAN, OCTROOIEN VOOR UITVINDINGEN IN DE
NEDERLANDEN UIT DE 16E-18E EEUW: MET BESPREKING VAN ENKELE
ONDERWERPEN UIT DEGESCHIEDENIS DER TECHNIEK (1942).
20. See Batavian Republic, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
place/Batavian-Republic (last visited May 12, 2019).
21. Besluit, Houdende Eene Wet op het Verleenen van Octrooijen op Nieuwe
Uitvindingen, Ontdekkingen en Verbeteringen Binnen het Koningrijk, Stcrt. 1809,
101 (Neth.) [hereinafter Patent Act of 1809].
22. GERRIT LUTTENBERG, REGISTER DER WETTEN EN BESLUITEN,
BETREKKELIJK HET OPENBAAR BESTUUR IN DE NOORD-NEDERLANDEN, SEDERT
1796 TOT 1813 50 (Zwolle, Doijer 1834).
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After the Netherlands regained their independence in 1813, the
Dutch legislator adopted the Patent Act of 28 January 1817 (Act
regarding the granting of exclusive rights to inventions and
improvements of objects of industrial art and people’s diligence).
23
It
remained in place until the government, by virtue of the Act of 15 July
1869, ceased to grant new patents while phasing out existing patents.
24
This Act, which had immediate effect, marked the beginning of a
patentless era that would last until 1 June 1912, when the 1910 Patent
Act entered into force.
25
III. THE PATENT ACT OF 1817 AND ITS
DEFICIENCIES
The Patent Act of 1817 differed significantly from its French
counterparts. While under the French decrees of 1791, inventors
enjoyed exclusive rights to obtain patents. Under the Dutch Patent Act,
patents were granted at the King’s discretion.
26
This made the patent
process arbitrary and rather unpredictable.
27
The government could
attach restrictive conditions to patent grants, e.g. to permit certain
industries to use patented inventions for particular beneficial purposes,
or exclude particular types of innovations from patent protection to
enhance competition.
28
This being reminiscent of old feudal practices,
calls were made to replace the patent grant by royal favour with a legal
entitlement to obtain patents upon fulfilment of statutory formalities,
as existed in other countries.
29
It was also suggested that patents should
23. Patent Act of 1817, supra note 13.
24. Wet tot Afschaffing van het Verleenen van Uitsluitende Rechten op
Uitvindingen en Verbeteringen van Voorwerpen van Kunst- en Volksvlijt, Stb.
1869, 126 (Neth.) [hereinafter Patent Abolition Act of 1869].
25. Wet tot Regeling van het Octrooirecht voor Uitvindingen, Stb. 1910, 313
(Neth.).
26. Patent Act of 1817, supra note 13, art. 1.
27. LODEWIJK W.P. PESSERS, THE INVENTIVENESS REQUIREMENT IN PATENT
LAW: AN EXPLORATION OF ITSFOUNDATIONS AND FUNCTIONING 220, n.804 (2016).
28. Gerard Doorman, Patent Law in the Netherlands: Suspended in 1869 and
Reestablished in 1910 Part I, 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 225, 226–27 (1948).
29. See J. Heemskerk Az., Iets over de Nederlandsche Wet van 1817 over de
Octrooijen voor Uitvindingen, enz., 2 DEVOLKSVLIJT 15, 26-28 (1855); see alsoW.
Sassen, Iets over Octrooien van Uitvinding, van Verbetering en van Invoer, en de
Deswege Bestaande Wetgeving in België, 3 THEMIS 140, 150 (1856).
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be granted without a prior examination.
30
The Patent Act of 1817 differentiated three types of patents. First,
patents could be granted for new inventions originating in the
Netherlands.
31
Commentators criticised the requirement of domestic
origin as inequitable, ineffective, and redundant, especially since the
location of an inventive act was often impossible to establish and
foreign inventors could always choose domicile in the Netherlands.
32
Moreover, while the law required absolute novelty,
33
in practice,
patents were also granted to new applications of old products.
34
Absent
plain definitions, the law further failed to identify protectable subject-
matter and clearly delineate its boundaries.
35
It seemingly conferred
patent protection on the concrete product in which the invention was
incorporated, rather than on the invention itself.
36
Indeed, in 1850, the
Supreme Court of the Netherlands ruled that the patent for an energy-
efficient stove with heating and circulation pipes gave the inventor the
exclusive right to apply the invention to the particular stove invented,
but not to other—equivalent—types of stoves, hearths, or fireplaces.
37
30. SeeA.J.B. STOFFELS, DEWETGEVING OPDEOCTROOIJEN VOORUITVINDING,
VERBETERING EN EERSTE INVOERING: EENE STAATHUISHOUDKUNDIGE PROEVE 54–
63 (Leiden, Gebhard & Hazenberg 1851); see also Heemskerk Az., supra note 29,
at 27; Sassen, supra note 29, at 153.
31. Patent Act of 1817, supra note 13, art. 1.
32. See J. HEEMSKERK AZ., VOORDRAGTEN OVER DEN EIGENDOM VAN
VOORTBRENGSELEN VAN DEN GEEST 32 (Amsterdam, Beerendonk, 2d rev. ed.
1869); STOFFELS, supra note 30, at 126-27; Heemskerk Az., supra note 29, at 21.
33. STOFFELS, supra note 30, at 126; see also Heemskerk Az., supra note 29, at
40 (suggesting that an absolute novelty criterion was too far-reaching, as it could not
be expected from inventors that they had read all the books, magazines, and journals
written on their respective expertise in any language in the world).
34. See Doorman, supra note 28, at 227.
35. See Heemskerk Az., supra note 29, at 21-23; see also S. Bleekrode, Nalezing
op het Iets over de Nederlandsche Octrooiwet des Heeren Mr. J. Heemskerk Az., 2
DEVOLKSVLIJT 43, 46–47 (1855) [hereinafter Bleekrode, Nalezing op het Iets over
de Nederlandsche Octrooiwet des Heeren Mr. J. Heemskerk Az.].
36. See Gemeenzaam Onderhoud, over de Octrooien voor Uitvindingen, in
VOORLEZINGEN OVER DEGESCHIEDENIS DERNIJVERHEID IN NEDERLAND 159, 167-
68 (Haarlem, Kruseman 1856) [hereinafter Gemeenzaam Onderhoud] (J. Boelen J.
Rzn. and E.H. von Baumhauer).
37. Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR] [Supreme Court of the Netherlands] 25
januari 1850, 34 NEDERLANDSCHE REGTSPRAAK 331 (Neth.) (upholding the
decision by the Court of Appeals of South-Holland of 30 June 1849).
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Second, patents were available for substantial improvements of
inventions.
38
While anyone could obtain patents on improvements, the
law did not adequately regulate the relation between first inventors and
third party improvers.
39
There was only a by-law, which stated that
patents for improvement pertained to the separate application of the
improvement, not to the initially patented object, and that first
inventors could not apply patented improvements owned by third
parties to objects first patented.
40
As a consequence, if third parties
obtained patents on improvements of a product, the first inventor
would be disadvantaged, because the success of a product often relied
on small improvements.
41
Therefore, commentators suggested that the
law should be changed to give first inventors a certain grace period to
improve their inventions and secure improvement patents, before
others be eligible to apply for the same.
42
Third, patents could be obtained for the first importation or
application in the Netherlands of foreign inventions or
improvements.
43
Their duration could not exceed the foreign term of
protection and their grant was subject to the patented objects being
manufactured in the Netherlands.
44
While importation patents were
designed to reward companies that invested in studying, familiarizing
and applying foreign inventions to enhance national industrial
progress,
45
they often were obtained by companies that did not intend
to exploit foreign inventions themselves, but rather speculated on
licensing or selling the patents to third parties if the inventions
appeared successful.
46
This harmed foreign inventors, domestic
38. See Patent Act of 1817, supra note 13, art. 1.
39. Id.
40. Reglement ter Uitvoering der Wet van den 25 januarij 1817, op het Uitgeven
van Octrooijen voor Uitvindingen, Invoeringen en Verbeteringen, Bijv. Stb. 1817,
IV, 62 & 262, §§ 8-10 (Neth.) [hereinafter Patent Regulations of 1817].
41. See Verslag van de Eerste Openbare Vergadering der Vereeniging voor
Volksvlijt, Gehouden te Amsterdam op Donderdag 26 October 1854 in het Odéon, 1
DE VOLKSVLIJT 528, 544 (1854) [hereinafter Verslag Vereeniging voor Volksvlijt
1854] (S. Bleekrode).
42. See Heemskerk Az., supra note 29, at 23-25.
43. Patent Act of 1817, supra note 13, art. 1.
44. Id. art. 5.
45. Bleekrode, Nalezing op het Iets over de Nederlandsche Octrooiwet des
Heeren Mr. J. Heemskerk Az., supra note 35, at 48.
46. Id.
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industries, and the Dutch society at large, as it deprived them of the
possibility to use foreign inventions until the importation patent is
annulled, for example, for reasons of non-usus.
47
This ground for
annulment, however, could only be invoked if two years had lapsed
since the patent grant.
48
The patent fees required by law also attracted criticism.
49
Patents
were granted for an initial term of five, ten, or fifteen years. Upon
request, five and ten-year patents were renewable until a maximum
term of fifteen years, but only for important reasons.
50
The law
stipulated that the fees varied between 150 and 750 guilders,
depending on the importance of an invention, but in reality they varied
according to the patent’s duration: 150 guilders for a five-year patent,
300 guilders for a ten-year patent, and 600 guilders for a fifteen-year
patent.
51
These fees were considered to be prohibitively high,
especially compared with other countries.
52
Moreover, they had to be
paid in full within three months after the patent was granted, otherwise
the patent would become null and void.
53
Commentators believed that
such fees discouraged inventors to apply for patent protection and
exploit their inventions in the Netherlands.
54
In practice, inventors were sometimes better off patenting
inventions in other countries first and later applying for importation
patents in the Netherlands if their inventions proved successful.
55
The
47. Patent Act of 1817, supra note 13, art. 8(c).
48. Id.
49. Heemskerk Az., supra note 29, at 30.
50. Patent Act of 1817, supra note 13, arts. 3–4.
51. Heemskerk Az., supra note 29, at 30.
52. Cf. B. Zorina Khan, An Economic History of Patent Institutions, EH.NET,
https://eh.net/encyclopedia/an-economic-history-of-patent-institutions/ (last visited
May 12, 2019) (discussing high costs in European patent systems).
53. SeeHEEMSKERKAZ., supra note 32, at 42; STOFFELS, supra note 30, at 131.
54. See Heemskerk Az., supra note 29, at 30; see also B.W.A.E. Sloet tot
Oldhuis, Eenige Aanmerkingen op de Wet van 25 Januarij, 1817, Omtrent het
Verleenen van Uitsluitende Regten op Uitvindingen en Verbeteringen van Kunst en
Volksvlijt, 1 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR STAATHUISHOUDKUNDE EN STATISTIEK 50, 55
(1842) [hereinafter Sloet tot Oldhuis, Eenige Aanmerkingen op de Wet van 25
Januarij, 1817].
55. Admittedly, inventors could only do so if no other person had obtained an
importation patent on their inventions. Yet, because of the practical application of
their inventions abroad, there was a good chance that they had subsequently
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patent annulment rules in the Patent Act of 1817 also encouraged
inventors to take this route.
56
These rules prevented Dutch patent
holders from seeking patent protection abroad by stipulating that their
patents be nullified if they obtained a foreign patent for the same
object after the patent grant.
57
Inventors could circumvent this,
however, by first obtaining a patent in another country and then
applying for an importation patent in the Netherlands.
58
It is unclear
whether the high percentage of importation patents in the Netherlands
was caused by a supremacy of foreign inventions over Dutch
inventions or by Dutch inventors taking the foreign route to evade the
sharp edges of the Patent Act of 1817, but their relatively large number
is certainly striking, as Table 1 corroborates.
59
improved their inventions, enabling them to apply for an importation patent on
improvements of their inventions that would still give them considerable
competitive advantage.
56. Sloet tot Oldhuis, Eenige Aanmerkingen op de Wet van 25 Januarij, 1817,
supra note 54, at 56–57.
57. Patent Act of 1817, supra note 13, art. 8(d).
58. STOFFELS, supra note 30, at 138–39; Heemskerk Az., supra note 29, at 41;
Sloet tot Oldhuis, Eenige Aanmerkingen op de Wet van 25 Januarij, 1817, supra
note 54, at 57.
59. Memorie van Toelichting bij het Ontwerp van Wet tot Afschaffing van het
Verleenen van Uitsluitende Regten op Uitvindingen en Verbeteringen van
Voorwerpen van Kunst en Volksvlijt, Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1868/69
II, 708, 710 (Neth.) [hereinafter Explanatory Memorandum].
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Table 1. Patents granted in the Netherlands for inventions of Dutch and
foreign origin 1851-1865




(fees not timely paid)
Total patents granted
(before fees were due)
Dutch Foreign Total Dutch Foreign Total Dutch Foreign Total
1851 7 36 43 7 56 63 14 92 106
1852 14 24 38 6 41 47 20 65 85
1853 11 42 53 10 86 96 21 128 149
1854 6 29 35 4 81 85 10 110 120
1855 14 35 49 11 89 100 25 124 149
1856 7 38 45 4 115 119 11 153 164
1857 4 29 33 3 86 89 7 115 122
1858 7 23 30 6 97 103 13 120 133
1859 3 26 29 9 82 91 12 108 120
1860 14 36 50 4 106 110 18 142 160
1861 2 35 37 6 125 131 8 160 168
1862 8 42 50 5 111 116 13 153 166
1863 15 32 47 5 107 112 20 139 159
1864 13 40 53 6 83 89 19 123 142
1865 21 36 57 4 98 102 25 134 159
Yearly
average 10 34 43 6 91 97 16 124 140
The Patent Act of 1817 lost much of its significance after the
Supreme Court of the Netherlands in 1846 had given a devastatingly
restrictive interpretation of the exclusive rights accruing to patent
owners.
60
The law gave patent owners exclusive rights to manufacture
and sell patented objects or to have themmanufactured and sold.
61
The
Supreme Court held the words “to manufacture and sell” to be
inseparable, thus affirming that the mere manufacturing or the mere
selling of patented objects constituted no infringement.
62
This
permitted anyone to manufacture patented objects for their own
private or commercial use,
63
rendering the exclusive rights of patent
60. Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR] [Supreme Court of the Netherlands] 20
maart 1846, 22 NEDERLANDSCHE REGTSPRAAK 377 (Neth.).
61. Patent Act of 1817, supra note 13, art. 6.
62. HR 20 maart 1846, 22 NEDERLANDSCHE REGTSPRAAK 337.
63. Id.
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owners ineffective and virtually meaningless.
64
However, this did not
significantly thwart the number of requests for patents in the
Netherlands,
65
as Table 1 illustrates. Between 1851 and 1865, the
Dutch authorities granted 140 patents per year on average, of which
forty-three patents were actually validly obtained.
66
Figures for 1831-
1842 show that in that period a total number of 509 patents (of which
319 importation patents) were validly obtained in the Netherlands,
which is an average of 42,4 patents (26,6 importation patents) granted
per year.
67
Accordingly, the statistics did not meaningfully change,
although compared to other European countries the number of Dutch
patent grants was certainly low.
68
The Patent Act of 1817 further lacked acceptable rules for
publication of patents.
69
The law required specifications and drawings
to be disclosed after the lapse or annulment of a patent, although
disclosure could be delayed if reasons of great importance (e.g.
political or commercial reasons) so demanded.
70
In practice,
publication never took place.
71
Most probably this was cost-related,
but it also did not help that the law did not prescribe a specific time
and manner of publication.
72
The fact that inventions were not
64. Heemskerk Az., supra note 29, at 34; Sassen, supra note 29, at 149, 155.
65. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 59, at 710.
66. Id.
67. See S. Bleekrode, Overzigt van de Vorderingen der Verschillende Takken
van Nijverheid, of Verslag van de Technologische Wetenschappen Gedurende 1843
en 1844, 9 TIJDSCHRIFT TER BEVORDERING VAN NIJVERHEID 339, 348 (1845).
68. Id. at 348 (calculating between the years of 1831 and 1841 a total of 1593
patent grants, with 403 importation patents in Belgium and a total of 6753 patent
grants, with 781 importation patents in France which is a yearly average of 144,8
patent grants, with 36,6 importation patents in Belgium and 613,9 patent grants, with
71 importation patents in France; and calculating between the years of 1838 and
1843 a total of 2452 patent grants, with 213 importation patents in Great Britain
which is a yearly average of 408,7 patent grants, with 35,5 importation patents).
69. Patent Act of 1817, supra note 13, art. 7.
70. Id.; Patent Regulations of 1817, supra note 40, § 14.
71. STOFFELS, supra note 30, at 137; Heemskerk Az., supra note 29, at 37.
72. HEEMSKERKAZ., supra note 32, at 47; Heemskerk Az., supra note 29, at 37;
J.L. De Bruyn Kops, Toespraak bij de Opening van den Cursus in de
Staathuishoudkunde 1867-68, Gehouden in het Auditorium der Polytechnische
School, 17 DE ECONOMIST 150, 151 (1868) (referring to the enormous cost of more
than one million guilders that the English Government had paid to establish records
of patent grants in its country).
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disclosed deemed to be against the public interest, which had a right
to know—either upon termination of the patent grant or earlier if
possible—what secrets lie behind patented inventions.
73
Other elements of the Patent Act of 1817 that were disputed
included the absence of a procedure to appeal royal decisions to deny
or annul patents;
74
the unclarity of judicial power to annul patents in
accordance with the law;
75
the fact that the transfer of patents was
subject to royal authorization;
76
that fees were due for the transfer and
inheritance of patents;
77
and that patent fees were never used to grant
prizes or rewards for the encouragement of industry, as the law
required (although the purpose of this rule was also criticized, as it
implied that patent holders were subsidizing competitors).
78
IV. CALLS FOR PATENT REFORM
Because the Patent Act of 1817 had many shortcomings, calls for
reform were increasingly made.
79
While little criticism was heard in
the first half of the nineteenth century,
80
voices to change the Patent
Act of 1817—or to abolish it altogether—became especially strong
after the adoption of the Belgian Patent Act in 1854.
81
The Dutch
followed the establishment of the new Belgian Patent Act very closely,
because after the Belgians had separated from the Netherlands in the
1830s, Dutch patent law continued to apply in Belgiumuntil 1840 and,
in amended form, until 1854.
82
Some commentators considered the
73. See STOFFELS, supra note 30, at 85–88 (suggesting that during the patent
term the invention should at least be open for public inspection by way of a
consultation of the registers).
74. Id. at 139-40.
75. Heemskerk Az., supra note 29, at 39.
76. STOFFELS, supra note 30, at 131; Heemskerk Az., supra note 29, at 32.
77. STOFFELS, supra note 30, at 130–31; Sassen, supra note 29, at 158.
78. STOFFELS, supra note 30, at 132–33; Heemskerk Az., supra note 29, at 42;
Sloet tot Oldhuis, Eenige Aanmerkingen op de Wet van 25 Januarij, 1817, supra
note 54, at 56.
79. Doorman, supra note 28, at 231.
80. Id.
81. WETGEVING ENANDEREOFFICIELESTUKKENBETREFFENDE DEOCTROOIJEN
VAN UITVINDING, INVOER ENVERBETERING INNEDERLAND ENZIJNEOVERZEESCHE
BEZITTINGEN, BENEVENS REGTSPRAAK, AANTEKENINGEN EN BIBLIOGRAPHIE
NOPENS HETONDERWERP 87 (‘s Gravenhage, Belinfante, 2nd rev. ed. 1867).
82. Id. at 83; S. Bleekrode, De Belgische Wet van 24 Mei 1854, op de Octrooijen
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Belgian Patent Act to be a useful guiding point for patent reform in the
Netherlands, but others were unconvinced of the operation of any




A first influential report that criticized the operation of the Patent
Act of 1817 was released by the Nederlandse Maatschappij ter
Bevordering van Nijverheid, the Dutch Society for the Promotion of
Industry (the Society).
84
Consistent with its broad mission to promote
trade, industry and social welfare generally, the Society was engaged
in all sorts of activities, varying from educating the industries to
alleviating poverty by securing employment for the poor.
85
Serving the
general interests of both businesses and the people, it not only stood
up against governmental policies that affected trade and the industries,
but also wrote petitions against foodstuff fraud, water and air pollution
and child labour.
86
In 1854, the Society appointed a committee, consisting of J.C. Faber
van Riemsdyk (a counselor-at-law, conservative politician, and
entrepreneur), G. Simons (a professor of mechanics and director of the
Royal Academy in Delft, conservative politician and later Minister of
the Interior from 1856 to 1857), and J. Ackersdyk (a lawyer,
economist, and professor of statistics at the University of Utrecht), to
examine the objections which the Patent Act of 1817 raised for the
industries.
87
It concluded that patents are unfavourable, as they restrict
the industries and obstruct competition. Disqualifying them as
“remnants of historical errors”, the committee called for a repeal of
the Patent Act of 1817.
88
van Uitvinding, 1 DEVOLKSVLIJT 357 (1854).
83. See HEEMSKERKAZ., supra note 32, at 7, 21.
84. See J.C. Faber van Riemsdyk et al., Rapport over het Onderzoek der
Bezwaren, Welke voor de Nijverheid in de Wet op de Octrooijen Gelegen Zijn, 17
TIJDSCHRIFT TER BEVORDERING VAN NIJVERHEID 282 (1854).
85. See generally J. BIERENS DE HAAN, VAN OECONOMISCHE TAK TOT
NEDERLANDSCHEMAATSCHAPPIJ VOORNIJVERHEID ENHANDEL: 1777-1952 (1952).
86. Id. at 95-96.
87. Faber van Riemsdyk et al., supra note 84, at 282–93.
88. See id. at 283–85, 293.
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To support its views, the committee debunked three main economic
arguments entertained in favour of patents.
89
First, it disagreed with
the idea that patents are the best means for securing inventors a just
reward for their labour.
90
The committee found that a genius does not
need monetary incentives and that most inventions in history had
occurred without patent protection.
91
Often it was only a matter of time
before someone made a particular invention, rendering the priority of
inventing a sheer coincidence.
92
Second, the committee opposed the idea that patents are needed to
give inventors a time-limit exclusivity to enable them to charge higher
prices for their products, so as to recoup the costs for putting new
inventions on the market.
93
It argued that the head-start profits that
inventors could make would generally suffice to financially reward
them, especially since imitators, who must also incur costs, will
usually not enter the market unless the products prove to generate a
reasonable turnover.
94
Third, the committee resisted the argument that, in return for
temporary protection, patent law properly induces inventors to
disclose their inventions to the public instead of keeping them secret.
95
It argued that inventors who knew how to keep their inventions secret
would not apply for time-limited patents, but rather conceal their
inventions to enjoy an enduring monopoly until the secrecy got
broken.
96
Only those who were unable to keep their inventions secret
and who faced the risk of instant competition would seek patent
protection.
97
The benefits of patents thus accrued too one-sidedly to
inventors who sought to eliminate competition, without giving the
public anything in return.
98
The committee found an additional argument for the abolition of the
89. See id. at 285–88.
90. See id. at 285–86.
91. See id. at 286.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 286–87.
94. See id. at 286.
95. See id. at 287–88.
96. See id. at 287.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 288.
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patent system in the example of Switzerland, a country without patent
protection but with a thriving industry.
99
It saw in this example
substantive proof to corroborate that the patent law could be abolished
to enhance industrial progress.
100
Interestingly, the committee found it necessary to consider the
economic effects of patents on the industry only, without discussing
legal arguments of the right and equity of patent protection.
101
It
simply denied that inventors had a “right” to receive protection for
their inventions and maintained that no reasons of justice could justify
obstructions of the industry.
102
Still, the committee was politically aware enough to realise that
patent abolition would not be foreseeable soon.
103
It therefore
proposed ten modifications that the legislator could adopt to make
patent law clearer, more effective, and slightly less attractive to
inventors.
104
To give further effect to the report, an address was sent
to the King expressing the wish to abolish the Patent Act of 1817 or
amend it as proposed.
105
An opposite position was taken by the Vereniging voor Volksvlijt,
the Association for People’s Diligence (the Association), which was
founded in 1852 to aid in the exercise of trade, industry, and
agriculture by exchanging knowledge, organising exhibitions, and
swiftly informing the public of useful inventions and improvements.
106
At its 1854 Amsterdam meeting, the Association concluded that the
Netherlands should maintain patents, but that the law must be
amended by fitting legal provisions.
107
During the discussions, the
Association assumed that inventors have a right to patent protection,






104. See id. at 289–92.
105. See Ingekomen Verzoekschriften, Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt.
1854/55 II, 31, 492 (Neth.).
106. See Het Paleis voor Volksvlijt, 4DEAMSTERDAMSCHEGIDS 218, 219 (1929),
also available at: http://www.paleisvoorvolksvlijt.nl/amsterdamschegids.shtml (last
visited May 12, 2019).
107. See Verslag Vereeniging voor Volksvlijt 1854, supra note 41, at 538–45.
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merits of such a right.
108
While a few members did acknowledge that
patents came with certain objections, the Association generally found
that these could not outweigh the advantages that industry could reap
from patents.
109
Having no time to discuss how Dutch patent law could
be improved, the Association suggested that the 1854 Belgian Patent
Act could perhaps serve as a blueprint for patent law reform.
110
Accordingly, industry representatives in the Netherlands were not
univocal in their calls for patent reform.
111
This became even clearer
after the board of the Vereniging ter Bevordering van Fabriek- en
Handwerksnijverheid in Nederland, the Association for the Promotion
of Industry and Crafts in the Netherlands, which had sent an address
to the King on 17 October 1855 expressing the wish to replace the
Patent Act of 1817 with a law similar to the 1854 Belgian Patent
Act,
112
forwarded the address to different Chambers of Commerce in
the Netherlands, inviting them to send letters of support to the
government. A group of industrials from Maastricht and eleven
Chambers of Commerce supported the address,
113
but the Rotterdam
Chamber of Commerce strongly dissented and argued that patents
hindered the Dutch industries.
114
The Rotterdam Chamber of
Commerce particularly condemned importation patents that prevented
Dutch companies from importing foreign inventions from abroad.
115
As a result, these inventions were available from domestic suppliers
only, often against higher prices and in poorer quality, if available at
all.
116
It further asserted that, since the marketplace in the Netherlands
108. See id. at 544.
109. See id. at 540–43.
110. See id. at 545.
111. Sassen, supra note 29, at 140–41.
112. See Ingekomen Verzoekschriften, Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt.
1855/56 II, 49 (Neth.). However, in 1868, the Vereniging ter Bevordering van
Fabriek- en Handwerksnijverheid in Nederland changed its opinion and supported
patent abolition, as it believed this would “free national industry from oppressing
and inefficient trammels”. See Ingekomen Verzoekschriften, Bijblad tot de
Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1868/69 II, 1467 (Neth.).
113. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 59, at 708.
114. See Adres van de Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrijken te Rotterdam, in
VOORDRAGTEN OVER DENEIGENDOM VANVOORTBRENGSELEN VAN DENGEEST 25–
29 (Amsterdam, Beerendonk, 2d rev. ed. 1869).
115. See id. at 27.
116. See id. at 28.
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is small, patents offered little incentives for companies to innovate and
were frequently used to prevent competition rather than to put
inventions to practical use.
117
The Rotterdam Chamber of Commerce,
therefore, wrote an address to the Commissioner of the King in South-
Holland urging the abolition of the Patent Act of 1817,
118
which was
supported by twelve other Chambers of Commerce.
119
In the years that followed, industry representatives remained
strongly disunited on the patent issue, although everyone agreed that
something had to be done.
120
The calls for abolishing the Patent Act of
1817 were taken very seriously though. In 1861 and 1864, an
anonymous patent supporter, who was also a member of the
Nederlandse Maatschappij ter Bevordering van Nijverheid, even
wrote two extensive booklets attempting to single-handedly dismiss
all the arguments put forward against patents.
121
He even went so far
as to call for an indefinitely renewable property right in inventions,
122
but – unsurprisingly – such pleas would never receive much support
in the Netherlands.
B. ACADEMICDEBATE
The positions of Dutch academics on patent protection were as
strongly divided as those of the industries. Patent advocates, calling
for a modernization of the Dutch Patent Act, included notable persons
like S. Bleekrode (professor of chemical technology at the Delft Royal
117. See id. at 28–29.
118. See id. at 25–29.
119. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 59, at 708.
120. SeeHEEMSKERKAZ., supra note 32, at 7–8; Gemeenzaam Onderhoud, supra
note 36, at 159 (H.J. Koenen).
121. See generally BEOORDEELING DERGRONDENVOOR EN TEGEN HETBILLIJKE,
ENVOOR DENIJVERHEIDAL OFNIETWENSCHELIJKE VAN HETDAARSTELLEN EENER
ALGEMEENEWET OP UITVINDIGEN EN VERBETERINGEN IN NEDERLAND: BENEVENS
DEGRONDSLAGEN,WAAROP EENEDUSDANIGEWET BIJ EVENTUELEDAARSTELLING
ZOU KUNNEN BERUSTEN (Deventer, Van den Sigtenhorst 1864) [hereinafter
BEOORDEELING DER GRONDEN VOOR EN TEGEN HET BILLIJKE]; BESCHOUWING
OVER HET WENSCHELIJKE DER DAARSTELLING EENER ALGEMEEN WERKENDE WET
TER VERKZEKERING VAN HET REGT OP UITVINDINGEN EN VERBETERINGEN
(VERVANGING DEROCTROOIWET) EN HETNAAUWEVERBAND TUSSCHEN DAT REGT
EN HET REGT VANCOPY (Deventer, Hoovenaar Rutering 1861).
122. See BEOORDEELING DER GRONDEN VOOR EN TEGEN HET BILLIJKE, supra
note 121, at 73.
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Academy),
123
J. Heemskerk Az. (an eminent lawyer, judge, and
liberal—though later conservative—politician, who served as
Minister of the Interior from 1866-1868, 1874-1877, and 1883-1888,
as Prime Minister of the Netherlands from 1874-1877 and 1883-1888
and asMinister of State from1885-1897),
124
A.F. de Savornin Lohman
(a noble, judge, lecturer in law at the Free University in Amsterdam
and anti-revolutionary Protestant-Christian parliamentarian, who




These advocates generally argued that the patent system, while in
need of reform, was “the most powerful means to support Dutch
industries.”
127
Without patent protection, inventors might keep their
inventions secret or move their businesses to other countries that
granted patent protection.
128
They maintained that patents were either
a necessary encouragement to invent or a reward for the time, labour,
and money expended in creating new inventions.
129
Additionally, they
asserted that, as nearly all other civilized countries had patent
legislation, the principle of patent protection was internationally
recognized.
130
They, therefore, concluded that inventors had a right to
patent protection and that it would be immoral, unjust, and illegitimate
123. See Bleekrode, Nalezing op het Iets over de Nederlandsche Octrooiwet des
Heeren Mr. J. Heemskerk Az., supra note 35, at 43–46; Gemeenzaam Onderhoud,
supra note 36, at 160 (S. Bleekrode); Verslag Vereeniging voor Volksvlijt 1854,
supra note 41, at 538–44 (Prof. Bleekrode).
124. See HEEMSKERK AZ., supra note 32, at 1–24, 52–53; see generally
Heemskerk Az., supra note 29.
125. See generally A.F. De Savornin Lohman, Over de Regten van den Uitvinder,
9 THEMIS 213 (1862) [hereinafter De Savornin Lohman, Over de Regten van den
Uitvinder]; see also A.F. De Savornin Lohman, Grond en Omvang van het Regt van
Schrijver en Uitvinder, 16 BIJDRAGEN TOT DE KENNIS VAN HET STAATS-,
PROVINCIAAL- EN GEMEENTE-BESTUUR IN NEDERLAND 1 (1870) [hereinafter De
Savornin Lohman, Grond en Omvang van het Regt van Schrijver en Uitvinder].
126. See, e.g., STOFFELS, supra note 30, at 3–28; see generally Sassen, supra note
29.
127. See Verslag Vereeniging voor Volksvlijt 1854, supra note 41, at 539 (Prof.
Bleekrode); see also HEEMSKERKAZ., supra note 32, at 12.
128. See HEEMSKERK AZ., supra note 32, at 12, 18; Heemskerk Az., supra note
29, at 17.
129. See STOFFELS, supra note 30, at 18; HEEMSKERKAZ., supra note 32, at 6–7,
18; Heemskerk Az., supra note 29, at 17; Sassen, supra note 29, at 145–46; Verslag
Vereeniging voor Volksvlijt 1854, supra note 41, at 539 (Prof. Bleekrode).
130. See Heemskerk Az., supra note 29, at 17–18.
2019] PATENT ABOLITION 897
to deny them such right.
131
They further urged that no self-respecting
government could openly favour copycats over inventors by
abolishing patent law.
132
Instead, they believed that the flaws of the
Patent Act of 1817 could be cured by taking example of better laws
existing elsewhere.
133
This was contested by B.W.A.E. Sloet tot Oldhuis (an economist,
lawyer, and liberal parliamentarian),
134
E. Star Busmann (a lawyer and
judge at the Amsterdam Court of Appeal),
135
J. Freseman Viëtor
(professor of law at the University of Groningen),
136
and A.M. Pareau
(a lawyer, judge, and vice-president of the AmsterdamDistrict Court),
among others.
137
Moreover, the editors of the Dutch journal De
Economist also published a series of articles in favour of abolishing
patents.
138
These opponents asserted that inventors had no inherent right to
inventions and that it would not be unjust or illegitimate to deny them
protection against imitation by others.
139
They maintained that
inventors were able to make a living without patents, because good
131. See HEEMSKERK AZ., supra note 32, at 53; De Savornin Lohman, Over de
Regten van den Uitvinder, supra note 125, at 216–21; Sassen, supra note 29, at 143.
132. HEEMSKERKAZ., supra note 32, at 53.
133. See HEEMSKERK AZ., supra note 32, at 21; Sassen, supra note 29, at 150;
Verslag Vereeniging voor Volksvlijt 1854, supra note 41, at 539 (Prof. Bleekrode).
134. See Sloet tot Oldhuis, Eenige Aanmerkingen op de Wet van 25 Januarij,
1817, supra note 54, at 50–52, 57; B.W.A.E. Sloet tot Oldhuis, Over de Wetgeving
op de Octrooijen, 6 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR STAATHUISHOUDKUNDE EN STATISTIEK 340,
340–46 (1855) [hereinafter Sloet tot Oldhuis, Over de Wetgeving op de Octrooijen].
135. See EDUARD STAR BUSMANN, OCTROOIJEN VAN UITVINDING (Groningen,
Wolters 1867).
136. See J. Freseman Viëtor, Eene Bijdrage tot het Leerstuk van den
Intellectueelen Eigendom: Octrooijen van Uitvinding – Acad. Proefschrift van E.
Star Busmann, Groningen, 1867, 15 BIJDRAGEN TOT DEKENNIS VAN HET STAATS-,
PROVINCIAAL- EN GEMEENTE-BESTUUR INNEDERLAND 1, 113 (1869).
137. See A.M. Pareau, Oktrooijen, 10 DE ECONOMIST 143 (1861).
138. See generally De Octrooijen van Uitvinding: Balans van Voor- en Nadeelen,
18 DE ECONOMIST 145 (1869); Een Dringend Woord over Eene Niet-Politieke
Hervorming, 17 DE ECONOMIST 1, 189 (1868); Nog een Woord over Octrooi-
Heffing: Regt en Nut, 18 DE ECONOMIST 777 (1869); Octrooijen van Uitvinding, 16
DE ECONOMIST 247 (1867); Staten-Generaal: Octrooijen, 18 DE ECONOMIST 601
(1869).
139. See STAR BUSMANN, supra note 135, at 15–68; Pareau, supra note 137, at
145–50; Sloet tot Oldhuis, Over de Wetgeving op de Octrooijen, supra note 134, at
340–43; Freseman Viëtor, supra note 136, at 10.
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inventions would always find their reward.
140
Moreover, the ability to
first exploit their inventions before others could step in, also gave
inventors strong financial advantages.
141
They further doubted that
patents actually encouraged inventors to make inventions,
142
as the
level of innovation in the Netherlands in those days was low to begin
with.
143
Some scholars even saw patents as “a premium for
incompetence, inadequacy and laziness,” as they feared that the
efficiency of inventors might be impeded through the prospect of
having their efforts and costs be recouped by patents.
144
Overall,
patents were considered to be welfare-reducing, because they hindered
industrial progress and because the public ultimately had to pay higher
prices resulting from patent monopolies, mostly to the benefit of
foreign inventors that owned the majority of Dutch patents.
145
Therefore, they concluded that the patent system could better be
abolished.
146
Others took a more neutral standpoint, signifying the intricacy of
the matter. J. de Bosch Kemper, a moderate conservative politician
and law professor at the Amsterdam Athenaeum Illustre, conceded
that he could not deny that fairness warranted protection for inventors.
However, as it could easily occur that two persons simultaneously
came to the same invention, he regarded it as unfair if protection only
accrued to the person first filing a patent application.
147
140. See STAR BUSMANN, supra note 135, at 15–68; Pareau, supra note 137, at
145–50; Sloet tot Oldhuis, Over de Wetgeving op de Octrooijen, supra note 134, at
340–43; Freseman Viëtor, supra note 138, at 10.
141. See STAR BUSMANN, supra note 135, at 73–75; Pareau, supra note 137, at
149, 151; Sloet tot Oldhuis, Eenige Aanmerkingen op de Wet van 25 Januarij, 1817,
supra note 54, at 51–52; Freseman Viëtor, supra note 136, at 149–53.
142. See STAR BUSMANN, supra note 135, at 87; Pareau, supra note 137, at 152–
53; Sloet tot Oldhuis, Eenige Aanmerkingen op de Wet van 25 Januarij, 1817, supra
note 54, at 50–51; Sloet tot Oldhuis, Over de Wetgeving op de Octrooijen, supra
note 134, at 343.
143. See Pareau, supra note 137, at 152.
144. Id. at 149.
145. See id. at 152 (stating that eighty percent of all patents in the Netherlands
were granted to foreigners); see also STAR BUSMANN, supra note 135, at 102–06;
Freseman Viëtor, supra note 136, at 160.
146. See STAR BUSMANN, supra note 135, at 102–06; Pareau, supra note 137, at
153; Freseman Viëtor, supra note 136, at 165–68.
147. Gemeenzaam Onderhoud, supra note 36, at 160–61.
2019] PATENT ABOLITION 899
Likewise, E.H. von Baumhauer, a professor of chemistry and
medical science at the Amsterdam Athenaeum Illustre, contended that
patents had positive as well as negative effects.
148
While patents
assured that inventors were rewarded for the time, labour, and money
spent, industries often prevented scientists from reaping the fruits of
their work by getting hold of their ideas and patents on their
inventions.
149
He openly queried whether patents should be maintained
to uphold their favourable effects or abolished to prevent their adverse
effects, admitting though that “the objections are certainly strong.”
150
J.L. de Bruyn Kops, a liberal politician, economist and professor of
statistics at the Polytechnic School of Delft, took a more critical stance
and called upon the government to quickly resolve the matter.
151
He
clearly favoured industrial freedom over patent protection, especially
for the Dutch industries, which were not known for their inventiveness
but which could benefit from the ability of using foreign inventions if
patents were abolished.
152
The academic debate largely mirrored the arguments put forward in
favour and against patents by the industries,
153
but with one important
exception. Many academics situated the debate in a more principled
legal discourse by invoking theories on the legal basis and principles
of patent protection to support their positions.
Virtually all commentators, including advocates of patent
protection, rejected the idea of patents as property, since inventions
are insusceptible to being owned, unless they are kept secret.
154
Once
an innovative idea is shared with others, the inventor loses exclusive
control over it: he no longer can exercise key attributes of private
property, such as the right to use, enjoy and dispose of it in the manner
as he pleases.
155
148. Id. at 161.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 162.
151. De Bruyn Kops, supra note 72, at 151–52.
152. Id. at 152.
153. See infra Part IV.A.
154. STOFFELS, supra note 30, at 3–16.
155. See id.; STAR BUSMANN, supra note 135, at 20–32; HEEMSKERKAZ., supra
note 32, at 2–4; Heemskerk Az., supra note 29, at 15–26; Sassen, supra note 29, at
140, 143; Pareau, supra note 137, at 145–49; Sloet tot Oldhuis, Eenige
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De Savornin Lohman, however, maintained that while no property
can exist in ideas, inventors own a property on the authority to exploit
their inventions at the exclusion of others.
156
The object of the
inventor’s property is thus not the invention itself, but the exclusive
power to put it into circulation as an object of trade.
157
He held that
inventors were entitled to this property because of the labour they exert
in making inventions.
158
Star Busmann and Freseman Viëtor contested
this theory, arguing that a right in rem could exist in incorporeal assets,
such as usufructs or pledges, but not in theoretically construed
powers.
159
Other patent advocates argued that patent protection was based on
a social contract.
160
In return for the disclosure of their ideas, which
allowed society to enjoy new inventions and build upon them, the state
agreed to grant inventors a time-limited statutory right to protect them
against imitation of their ideas.
161
Freseman Viëtor, however, held that
it may be fair to reward inventors for the services they render to
society, but this does not yet give them a right to claim a reward, unless
agreed upon in advance.
162
Otherwise, anyone providing a useful
service to society could demand such right.
163
Patent advocates also referred to the principle of fairness to claim
that inventors had a right to obtain patents for inventions.
164
They
Aanmerkingen op de Wet van 25 Januarij, 1817, supra note 54, at 340–41; Freseman
Viëtor, supra note 136, at 16–25.
156. De Savornin Lohman, Over de Regten van den Uitvinder, supra note 125, at
222–29.
157. De Savornin Lohman, Grond en Omvang van het Regt van Schrijver en
Uitvinder, supra note 125, at 98.
158. De Savornin Lohman, Over de Regten van den Uitvinder, supra note 125, at
230.
159. STAR BUSMANN, supra note 135, at 28; Freseman Viëtor, supra note 136, at
31.
160. HEEMSKERKAZ., supra note 32, at 5–7.
161. Id.; see also STOFFELS, supra note 30, at 16–28; Sassen, supra note 29, at
144–45.
162. Freseman Viëtor, supra note 136, at 35; see also STARBUSMANN, supra note
135, at 41.
163. Freseman Viëtor, supra note 136, at 151 (referring to tradesmen discovering
new trade routes, who cannot claim exclusivity to use such routes); see also Pareau,
supra note 137, at 149 (referring to tradesmen that start a new market, who cannot
claim exclusivity to operate on that market).
164. STOFFELS, supra note 30, at 18.
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contended that fairness required society to grant patent protection to
properly reward inventors for their inventions and prevent unjust
enrichment by imitators.
165
Since patents were granted to the first
applicant and not to the true inventor, however, opponents argued that
patent law did not guarantee that inventors received a fair reward.
166
Freseman Viëtor, moreover, repeated that it may be fair, on principle,
to reward inventors, but that fairness could never be a ground for the
state to grant patent rights unless the public interest so requires.
167
Taking the public interest as a starting point for legislative action,
Freseman Viëtor clearly was a proponent of utilitarian principles.
168
For reasons stated above, he denied that inventors had a right to patent
protection based on property, social contract or fairness theories.
169
The lawmaker could grant patent rights, but only if this were useful
and not in conflict with the public interest.
170
Such rights, he argued,
were a legislative creation, not a natural or pre-existing entitlement.
171
Applying the public interest test, he concluded (i) that the value of the
service that inventors rendered to society was limited, as most
inventions are a natural result of scientific progress and will likely
occur anyway; (ii) that inventors did not need patents to secure a
proper income, because they can benefit from the honour and
reputation conferred upon them and from a first-mover advantage,
enabling them to make head-start profits and to improve inventions
before others can do; (iii) that patents imposed costs on inventors,
including costs of obtaining patents and of possible legal proceedings,
while not providing themwith true legal certainty; and (iv) that patents
cause detriment to society by allowing patent holders to charge
monopoly prices, making the public pay more for patented objects
than it would pay for the same objects in a free competition.
172
He thus
165. See HEEMSKERK AZ., supra note 32, at 6–7 (proper reward); De Savornin
Lohman, Grond en Omvang van het Regt van Schrijver en Uitvinder, supra note
125, at 17–44 (unjust enrichment); De Savornin Lohman, Over de Regten van den
Uitvinder, supra note 125, at 234–35 (unjust enrichment).
166. STAR BUSMANN, supra note 135, at 76, 109–10.
167. Freseman Viëtor, supra note 136, at 41–42.
168. Id. at 9.
169. Id. at 4–9.
170. Id. at 9.
171. Id. at 42–43.
172. Id. at 143–68.
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found that there was no utility in granting patents and that the
lawmaker should better abolish them.
173
Accordingly, there was strong disagreement among Dutch legal
thinkers about the legal basis and principles of patent protection.
174
In
the absence of a commonly accepted theory, the debate essentially
resolved around the question whether patents were in the public
interest.
175
Patent advocates asserted that the public interest required patents to
be continued.
176
Arguing that inventors had a right to patents, they
insisted that this right ought to be recognized and enforced, otherwise
it would destroy the foundations of society and, with it, society
itself.
177
But even if inventors had no natural right to protection, it
would be in the public interest to reward inventors for the service they
render to society by granting them protection against imitation.
178
Opponents, on the other hand, maintained that the public had
nothing to win with patents, because inventions would be made
regardless of their legal protection, whereas patents only resulted in
higher prices for society and obstructed industrial progress.
179
Being
detrimental to the public interest, so they argued, patents had to be
abolished so that industrial freedom could prevail.
180
V. POLITICAL RESPONSE AND THE ADOPTION
OF THE PATENT ABOLITION ACT
What did the Dutch government have to make of all of the above?
The opinions of scholars and the industries at the time diverged so
173. Id. at 165–68.
174. See De Savornin Lohman, Grond en Omvang van het Regt van Schrijver en
Uitvinder, supra note 125, at 1–4.
175. Id. at 4 (admitting that there were conflicting theories on the nature and legal
basis of patents in the Netherlands and contending that, because of this, the legislator
could only rely on a sense of fairness, which in his view was equivalent to sailing
without a compass).
176. STOFFELS, supra note 30, at 3, 18–20.
177. De Savornin Lohman, Over de Regten van den Uitvinder, supra note 125, at
252–54.
178. STOFFELS, supra note 30, at 125.
179. STAR BUSMANN, supra note 135, at 86–106; Pareau, supra note 137, at 155;
Sloet tot Oldhuis, Over de Wetgeving op de Octrooijen, supra note 134, at 343–46.
180. Freseman Viëtor, supra note 136, at 167–68.
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widely that no uniform conclusion could be drawn from them. So how
did this translate into politics?
From 1855 onwards, the question of whether patent law should be
reformed or abolished was repeatedly raised during parliamentary
deliberations on the State Budget.
181
In 1855, the Minister of the
Interior acknowledged that there were strong differences of opinion
on this matter, but that he was investigating it and would afterwards
propose a bill to end the controversy.
182
In the following years,
parliamentarians recurrently called upon the government to act.
183
The
consecutive Ministers of the Interior responded that they were looking
into the matter. They all agreed that the Patent Act of 1817 did not
function adequately but did not yet disclose whether the government
favoured patent reform or abolition.
184
In 1857, the conservative
Minister Van Rappert stated that the government was unwilling to
propose patent reform until convinced that patent law should not be
repealed altogether.
185
Liberal-conservative cabinets that ruled in
181. Een Dringend Woord over eene Niet-Politieke Hervorming, supra note 138,
at 201–04.
182. Staatsbegrooting voor 1855, Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1854/55 I,
84 (Neth.). See id. at 81, 88 (illustrating the different viewpoints expressed by
senator Regout, calling for an improvement of the patent law and senator Van
Rijckevorsel, calling for complete freedom of trade and the abolition of patents).
183. Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1858, Voorloopig Verslag der
Commissie van Rapporteurs voor Hoofdstukken IV en V, Bijblad tot de
Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1857/58 I, 46 (Neth.); Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar
1859, Beraadslaging over hoofdstuk V, Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1858/59
I, 95 (Neth.) (Regout); Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1859, Voorloopig
Verslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs voor Hoofdstuk V, Bijblad tot de
Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1858/59 II, 314 (Neth.); Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar
1860, Beraadslaging over hoofdstuk V, Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1859/60
II, 468 (Neth.) (Wintgens); Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1860, Voorloopig
Verslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs voor Hoofdstuk V, Bijblad tot de
Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1859/60 II, 229 (Neth.); Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar
1861, Voorloopig Verslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs voor Hoofdstuk V,
Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1860/61 II, 353 (Neth.); Staatsbegrooting voor
het Dienstjaar 1862, Voorloopig Verslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs voor
Hoofdstuk V, Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1861/62 II, 193 (Neth.).
184. See Een Dringend Woord over eene Niet-Politieke Hervorming, supra note
138, at 201–02.
185. See Memorien van Antwoord der Regering op het Verslag der
onderscheidene Commissien van Rapporteurs omtrent de begrooting van
Staatsuitgaven en Middelen voor het Dienstjaar 1858, Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche
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subsequent years repeated that, given the uncertainties on the matter,
government had not yet taken any decision.
186
In 1861, by contrast, the
pragmatic-liberal Minister Van Heemstra suggested that patent reform
seemed not so urgent, because the industry appeared to attach value to
patent protection, given the increased number of patent applications.
187
Parliamentary discussions in ensuing years reveal that the calls of
parliamentarians got stronger while opinions on the matter got further
divided.
188
In 1862, the Dutch government was again called upon to
resolve the issue. Some parliamentarians urged the government to
abolish patents, arguing that patents do not benefit a relative small
country such as the Netherlands and produce needless obstacles for
the industries, while others stated that patents should be maintained to
safeguard the natural rights of inventors, but in such a way that they
do not favour foreign over Dutch inventors.
189
Reports on the State
Budget for 1864 to 1866 contain similarly divided calls for legislative
action.
190
Stcrt. 1857/58 I, 55 (Neth.).
186. See Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1859, Beraadslaging over
hoofdstuk V, supra note 183, at 97 (J.G.H. van Tets van Goudriaan);
Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1859, Memorie van Beantwoording van het
Voorlopig Verslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs voor Hoofdstuk V, Bijblad tot
de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1858/59 II, 406 (Neth.); Staatsbegrooting voor het
Dienstjaar 1860, Memorie van Beantwoording van het Voorlopig Verslag der
Commissie van Rapporteurs, Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1859/60 II, 301
(Neth.); Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1861, Memorie van Beantwoording
van het Voorlopig Verslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs, Bijblad tot de
Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1860/61 II, 445 (Neth.).
187. SeeMemorie van Beantwoording van het Voorlopig Verslag der Commissie
van Rapporteurs voor het Ontwerp van Wet tot Vaststelling van Hoofdstuk V der
Begrooting van Staatsuitgaven voor het Dienstjaar 1862, Bijblad tot de
Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1861/62 II, 399 (Neth.).
188. See Een Dringend Woord over eene Niet-Politieke Hervorming, supra note
138, at 203.
189. See Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1863, Voorloopig Verslag der
Commissie van Rapporteurs voor Hoofdstuk V, Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt.
1862/63 II, 290 (Neth.).
190. Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1864, Voorloopig Verslag der
Commissie van Rapporteurs voor Hoofdstuk V, Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche
Stcrt.1863/64 II, 309 (Neth.); Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1865, Voorloopig
Verslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs voor Hoofdstuk V, Bijblad tot de
Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1864/65 II, 336 (Neth.); Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar
1866, Voorloopig Verslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs voor Hoofdstuk V,
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In 1862, the liberal Minister Thorbecke initially asked time to
prepare a bill,
191
but the following year he still had not taken up the
matter.
192
This prompted Heemskerk Az. to hold a plea before
Parliament, urging the Minister to take the issue seriously, thereby
emphasizing that an abolition of patents would be highly unfair and
ineffective, forcing inventors to seek protection abroad.
193
He rather
saw the Dutch government adopting the example of the 1854 Belgium
Patent Act.
194
Thorbecke replied that he could not promise any bill at
the time.
195
In 1864 and 1865, Wintgens defended the opposite position.
196
He
stated that the patent controversy could simply be resolved by
repealing the patent law.
197
He argued that, in the interest of industries
and inventors themselves, patents should be abolished.
198
He referred
to French reports and British authorities to support his position,
including reports of Legrand and Chevalier,
199
which the government
would later use to defend the Patent Abolition Bill.
200
Thorbecke responded that, while the idea of abolishing patents was
tempting, doing so would not be so easy.
201
He observed that a patent
Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1865/66 II, 553 (Neth.).
191. See Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1863, Memorie van Beantwoording
van het Voorlopig Verslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs voor Hoofdstuk V,
Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1862/63 II, 345 (Neth.).
192. See Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1864, Memorie van Beantwoording
van het Voorlopig Verslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs voor Hoofdstuk V,
Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1863/64 II, 353 (Neth.).
193. Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1864, Beraadslaging over hoofdstuk V,
Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1863/64 II, 258/1 (Neth.).
194. Id. at 258/1.
195. Id. at 258/4.
196. Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1865, Beraadslaging over hoofdstuk V,
Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1864/65 II, 349 (Neth.); Staatsbegrooting voor
het Dienstjaar 1866, Beraadslaging over hoofdstuk V, Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche
Stcrt. 1865/66 II, 256 (Neth.).
197. See Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1865, Beraadslaging over
hoofdstuk V, supra note 196, at 349.
198. See Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1866, Beraadslaging over
hoofdstuk V, supra note 196, at 256.
199. See Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1865, Beraadslaging over
hoofdstuk V, supra note 196, at 349.
200. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 59, at 708.
201. See Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1865, Memorie van Beantwoording
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industry had gradually been established that yielded a lot of money,
but he could not assess whether that industry was useful and in the
interest of companies.
202
He argued that any resolution should be
informed not just by common understanding, but by examining the
matter in relation to the state of the industry as a whole and the laws
in other countries.
203
Hence, Thorbecke was careful not to take
uninformed decisions.
204
De Economist reported that, before his
resignation, Thorbecke was working on a bill to abolish patents.
205
However, it was never presented before Parliament, as the cabinet
Thorbecke-II fell in early 1866.
206
The political situation changed under the conservative cabinet Van
Zuylen-Van Nijevelt, when Heemskerk Az. became Minister of the
Interior. While parliamentarians continued their calls for patent reform
or abolition,
207
Heemskerk Az. stated that, as long as other larger
nations had not taken steps to abolish patents, the government was
unsympathetic to the idea to do so in the Netherlands.
208
Until patent
laws were repealed in other countries, the Minister was in favour of a
continuation of patents along the lines of the 1854 Belgian Act.
209
He
also considered patent abolition unadvisable, because in the absence
van het Voorlopig Verslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs voor Hoofdstuk V,
Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1864/65 II, 411 (Neth.).
202. See Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1865, Beraadslaging over
hoofdstuk V, supra note 196, at 356/2.
203. Id. at 356/2; see also Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1866,
Beraadslaging over hoofdstuk V, supra note 196, at 262/1.
204. Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1866, Memorie van Beantwoording van
het Voorlopig Verslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs voor Hoofdstuk V, Bijblad
tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1865/66 II, 591 (Neth.).
205. Een Dringend Woord over eene Niet-Politieke Hervorming, supra note 138,
at 204.
206. Id. at 204.
207. See Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1867, Voorloopig Verslag der
Commissie van Rapporteurs voor Hoofdstuk V, Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt.
1866/67 II, 377 (Neth.); Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1868, Voorloopig
Verslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs voor Hoofdstuk V, Bijblad tot de
Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1867/68 II, 268 (Neth.); Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar
1869, Voorloopig Verslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs voor Hoofdstuk V,
Bijblad tot de Nederlandsch Stcrt. 1868/69 II, 579 (Neth.).
208. Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1867, Memorie van Beantwoording van
het Voorlopig Verslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs voor Hoofdstuk V, Bijblad
tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1866/67 II, 483 (Neth.).
209. Id. at 483.
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of a right, inventors could not protect their inventions, except by
keeping them secret.
210
The cabinet Van Zuylen-Van Nijevelt thus
preferred to reform patent law,
211
but it fell before it got the
opportunity to start crafting a bill to that effect.
212
In 1868, the Dutch patent controversy finally got resolved under the
liberal cabinet Van Bosse-Fock.
213
This cabinet took things forward
much more vigorously. Despite the concerns about abolishing patents
under the former cabinet, on 29 November 1868, within six months
from its inauguration, the cabinet Van Bosse-Fock proposed a bill to
dismantle the Patent Act of 1817.
214
The preamble reveals that the bill
was put forward as “the grant of exclusive rights on inventions and
improvements or the first importation of industrial objects supported
neither the true interests of the industries nor the public interest”.
215
Containing only two provisions, the bill set out that no new patents
would be granted from and after 1 January 1870 (Article 1), but that
existing patents could still be renewed in accordance with the Patent
Act of 1817 (Article 2).
216
Accordingly, the bill did not repeal the
Patent Act of 1817, but effectively suspended its practical operation.
217
Minister Fock managed to have the bill pass Parliament very
smoothly. It faced opposition inter alia from Heemskerk Az., Van
Zinnicq Bergmann and Van Bylandt, who held pleas against it during
the plenary debates in the House and Senate.
218
This did not have a
210. Staatsbegrooting voor het Dienstjaar 1868, Memorie van Beantwoording van
het Voorlopig Verslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs voor Hoofdstuk V, Bijblad
tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1867/68 II, 400 (Neth.).
211. See id. at 400.
212. See Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12,
at 1476 (containing Heemskerk Az.’s statement that no patent reform bill had been
drafted during the time that he was Minister of the Interior).
213. See Machlup & Penrose, supra note 9, at 4–5 (“The debate ended with a
victory for the abolitionists: in July 1869 the patent law was repealed.”).
214. Ontwerp van Wet tot Afschaffing van het Verleenen van Uitsluitende Regten
op Uitvindingen en Verbeteringen van Voorwerpen van Kunst en Volksvlijt, Bijblad
tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1868/69 II, 708 (Neth.) [hereinafter Patent Abolition
Bill].
215. Id. at 708.
216. Id.
217. J.C.TH. RESIUS UITVINDING, UITVINDER EN OCTROOI VOLGENS DE
OCTROOIWET 1910 32 (1913).
218. Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12, at
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great impact. The House of Representatives adopted the bill with a
vote of forty-nine against eight and the Senate with a vote of twenty-
nine against one.
219
The bill was passed with only one amendment,
namely that the discontinuation of patent grants should take effect not





VI. MOTIVATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
BEHIND THE ADOPTION OF THE PATENT
ABOLITION ACT
The previous section has shown that the decision to put forward a
bill to abolish the patent system rather than to reform the law was not
so easy and straightforward. It took roughly thirteen years of
deliberation by different cabinets before a bill was presented before
Parliament. This raises the question what motivated the cabinet Van
Bosse-Fock to propose the bill and what considerations prompted
Parliament to adopt it.
A. LEGALARGUMENTS
A first and very significant step towards the adoption of the Patent
Abolition Bill was the refusal to accept that inventors have a pre-
existing right in their inventions which the state needs to protect.
222
The government acknowledged that this question dominated all other
1457–64, 1467–81 (Van Zinnicq Bergmann and Heemskerk Az.); Verslag der
Handelingen van de Eerste Kamer der Staten-General, Afschaffing van het
Verleenen van Uitsluitende Regten op Uitvindingen en Verbeteringen van Kunst en
Volksvlijt, Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1868/69 I, 344–46 (Neth.)
[hereinafter Deliberations of the Senate on the Patent Abolition Bill] (Van Bylandt).
219. Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12, at
1480–81; Deliberations of the Senate on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 218,
at 346.
220. Aanwijzing Eener Verandering in het Ontwerp van Wet tot Afschaffing van
het Verleenen van Uitsluitende Regten op Uitvindingen en Verbeteringen van
Voorwerpen van Kunst en Volksvlijt, Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1868/69 I,
334 (Neth.); Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12,
at 1480 (showing that this amendment was proposed by Lenting).
221. Patent Abolition Act of 1869, supra note 24.
222. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 59, at 709; Memorie van Antwoord,
Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1868/69 I, 338, 339 (Neth.) [hereinafter
Memorandum in Reply].
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issues.
223
If it could be established that inventors have a right of
property or other ownership right in their inventions, then such a right
ought to be recognized.
224
The government refuted, however, that inventors have a natural
right from which they cannot be legally deprived.
225
It simply denied
that inventors have a property right in their inventions, because no
country thus far had conferred perpetual protection on inventors,
which it considered to be an essential attribute of property.
226
It further
argued that, if inventors had a right to be rewarded for their services
to society, then this should not have to exist in a right to prevent others
from exploiting a useful product.
227
The fact that some industries,
which also provided useful services to society, were excluded from
patent protection was reason enough not to accept the establishment
of such a right.
228
For additional arguments, the government simply
referred to academic writings on this matter and to the reports of
Michel Chevalier and Arthur Legrand, which were included (in a
Dutch translation) as an appendix to the explanatory memorandum.
229
During the parliamentary discussions, Van Zinnicq Bergmann,
Heemskerk Az., and Van Bylandt challenged the government’s
viewpoint that inventors have no natural right in their inventions.
230
They insisted that the temporariness of protection was not a reason to
refuse patents the status of property,
231
because property can always
223. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 59, at 709.
224. Id. at 709; Memorandum in Reply, supra note 222, at 339.
225. Deliberations of the Senate on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 218, at
346 (Minister Fock).
226. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 59, at 709.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Bijlage B: Exposition Universelle de Londres de 1862 - Rapports des
Membres de la Section Française du Jury International sur l’Ensemble de
l’Exposition Publiés sous la Direction de M. Michel Chevalier, Président de la
Section Française du Jury International. Introduction pag. CLXI-CLXXII.
Legislation des Brevets d’Invention a Réformer (Vertaling), Bijblad tot de
Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1868/69 II, 713 (Neth.).
230. See Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12,
at 1458 (Van Zinnicq Bergmann), 1459–60, 1475 (Heemskerk Az.); Deliberations
of the Senate on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 218, at 345 (Van Bylandt).
231. Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12, at
1458 (Van Zinnicq Bergmann).
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be restricted by the state.
232
Heemskerk Az. moreover argued that
inventors have a right to protection, first, because on the basis of the
Roman principle of occupatio, inventions become the property of the
first person taking possession of them; and, second, because no one
may enrich himself at the expense of others, while imitators clearly
enrich themselves at the expense of inventors.
233
He said that
government could not deny a right, which has been recognized in
Dutch laws and in the laws of all civilized countries for a century.
234
Most parliamentarians, however, supported the government’s
position. They argued that the characteristics of patents, namely that
they are limited in time and granted only upon the payment of fees,
conflict with the notion of property.
235
They further rejected the
principle of acquisition of patents through occupatio, because
occupatio is meant to prevent others from appropriating a good, which
can apply only to tangible objects, not to inventions.
236
They stated
moreover that imitators, while possibly frustrating the profit
expectations of inventors, do not unjustly enrich themselves at their
expense.
237
Lastly, they regarded patents as remnants of abolished
monopolies based on royal favour and considered it a historical
mistake if they were given the status of intellectual property.
238
232. Verslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs Omtrent het Ontwerp van Wet tot
Afschaffing van het Verleenen van Uitluitende Regten op Uitvindingen en
Verbeteringen van Voorwerpen van Kunst en Volksvlijt, Bijblad tot de
Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1868/69 I, 338 (Neth.) [hereinafter Senate Report on the Patent
Abolition Bill].
233. Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12, at
1459–60, 1475.
234. Id. at 1460.
235. Eindverslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs voor het Ontwerp van Wet tot
Afschaffing van het Verleenen van Uitsluitende Regten op Uitvindingen en
Verbeteringen van Voorwerpen van Kunst en Volksvlijt, Bijblad tot de
Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1868/69 II, 1160, 1161 (Neth.) [hereinafter Final Report of the
House on the Patent Abolition Bill]; see also Deliberations of the House on the
Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12, at 1467–68 (Van houten), 1469 (Godefroi),
1479 (Gefken).
236. Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12, at
1468 (Van Houten), 1469 (Godefroi).
237. Id. at 1468 (Van Houten).
238. Final Report of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 235, at
1161. But see Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note
12, at 1459 (containing Heemskerk Az.’s argument that, historically speaking,
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Accordingly, neither the government nor the majority of Parliament
accepted that inventors have a property right or other ownership right
that entitled them to patent protection.
239
As a result, the utility of
patents became the central issue on which the faith of Dutch patent
law came to rest.
240
The Patent Abolition Bill deliberations thus turned
into an appraisal of (i) the interest of inventors versus the interest of
the public in patent protection, (ii) the ability of patent law to
accommodate both interests, and (iii) the consequences of abolishing
patent law.
241
This shifted the debate largely from the legal domain, in
which the proposal was tested against questions of right and equity, to
the economic domain, in which the general welfare effects of the
proposal were to be measured by balancing the interests of inventors
against those of the public.
242
B. ECONOMICARGUMENTS
The utilitarian approach adoption turned out to be a step to decide
the patent controversy in favour of the patent abolitionists. Assessing
patent law against principles of utility and the public interest, the
government – and ultimately Parliament, too – concluded that patents
should be abolished, because they “supported neither the true interests
patents had their origin in the liberation and cultivation of free spirits and the
ennobling of intellectual labour).
239. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 59, at 709; Memorandum in Reply,
supra note 222, at 339; Final Report of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra
note 235, at 1161.
240. Many politicians supported a utilitarian approach. See Deliberations of the
House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12, at 1462–64, 1477–78 (De Bruyn
Kops), 1468–69 (Van Houten), 1469–71, 1478–79 (Godefroi), 1471–72 (Du
Marchie van Voorthuysen), 1479 (Gefken); Deliberations of the Senate on the Patent
Abolition Bill, supra note 218, at 345–46 (Cremers).
241. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 59, at 709–11.
242. Illustrative is the address of the director of the Société Céramique and
twenty-four factories in Maastricht calling upon the Senate not to abolish but to
revise patent law, thus “abstaining from favouring the public interest over principles
of right and equity.” By contrast, the Vereniging ter Bevordering van Fabriek- en
Handwerksnijverheid in Nederland and F. van Motman, an inventor from the
province of Frisia, wrote addresses asking Parliament to adopt the Patent Abolition
Bill. See Ingekomen Verzoekschriften, Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1868/69
I, 344 (Neth.); Ingekomen Verzoekschriften, Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt.
1868/69 II, 1448 (Neth.).
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of the industries nor the public interest”.
243
The economic appraisal
thus carried much weight, urging some lawyers to state somewhat
sarcastically that the abolition of patents was eventually the result of
“economists-patent-abolitionists”.
244
Putting patent law to the test, the government held that, while
patents might bring some inventors an uncertain benefit, overall, they
appear not to favour them.
245
The law basically required inventors to
obtain patents, because otherwise a third person might do so and hold
the patents against them, thus preventing true inventors from
exploiting their own inventions.
246
Inventors were also confronted
with higher prices if the resources they need for making inventions
were patented.
247
The government further asserted that patent law gave
rise to many legal disputes.
248
Heemskerk Az., however, rightly
pointed out that this argument was false. He could only recall two
patent cases since the Patent Act was adopted in 1817.
249
Minister
Fock, who had to admit the mistake, replied that the small number of
patent cases was caused by the defectiveness of the Patent Act of 1817
and how it does not really provide true protection to inventors.
250
The government further expected that abolishing patents would not
hurt the Dutch industries.
251
Pointing at the number of patents granted
in the Netherlands between 1851 and 1865 (see Table 1 above), the
243. Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 214, 708 (preamble).
244. De Savornin Lohman, Over de Regten van den Uitvinder, supra note 125, at
219. See also De Savornin Lohman, Grond en Omvang van het Regt van Schrijver
en Uitvinder, supra note 125, at 15 (stating that “with those kinds of utility-teachers
no legal debate can be started”).




249. Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12, at
1461; Deliberations of the Senate on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 218, at
338.
250. SeeMemorandum in Reply, supra note 222, at 339.
251. To support this, it attached the 1854 report of the Nederlandse Maatschappij
ter Bevordering van Nijverheid as an appendix to the explanatorymemorandum. See
Bijlage A: Rapport eener Commissie uit de Nederlandsche Maatschappij ter
Bevordering van Nijverheid, over “het Onderzoek der Bezwaren, Welke voor de
Nijverheid in de Wet op de Octrooijen Gelegen Zijn”, Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche
Stcrt. 1868/69 II, 711 (Neth.).
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government concluded that, on average, Dutch inventors obtained
only ten patents per year, implying that patent law was largely a
redundant institution.
252
Moreover, ninty percent of all patents (124
out of 140) were granted to foreigners, who allegedly applied for
Dutch patents with the purpose not to exploit their inventions in the
Netherlands, but to prevent competition by Dutch companies or to
speculate on selling their patents to Dutch industries.
253
If the risk of
their inventions being exploited by others waned, they often let their
patents lapse by not paying the required fees.
254
This gave them a
significant head-start over possible Dutch competitors.
255
The government also deemed that patents were against the public
interest, because, due to monopoly rents, patented objects tend to be
more expensive than those produced in free competition.
256
Furthermore, it argued that during the time of patent protection, the
development of patented objects halted.
257
While the government
admitted that it could be questioned whether useful inventions would
still take place if patents were abolished, it saw in Switzerland an
example of a country without patent protection that still had a
flourishing industry.
258
It therefore posited that, if all agree on the
system of free trade, why not eliminate the barriers that patents still
create for industry, too?
259
252. Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12, at
1472 (Minister Fock). See also Final Report of the House on the Patent Abolition
Bill, supra note 235, at 1161. But see Deliberations of the House on the Patent
Abolition Bill, supra note 12, at 1461 (containing Heemskerk Az.’s argument that
the small number of patents obtained by Dutch inventors could not be used as a
reason to abolish patent law, because it did not prove that the patent system had
failed).
253. See Christopher May & Susan Sell, Presentation at Birkbeck College,
University of London, Forgetting History is not an Option! Intellectual Property,
Public Policy and Economic Development in Context, 12 (Sept. 15, 2006),
http://www.dime-eu.org/files/active/0/MaySell.pdf (last visited May 12, 2019).
254. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 59, at 710.
255. As observed, the patent fees were due within three months after the patent
grant. STOFFELS, supra note 30, at 131. On request of the applicants, however, the
three-month term could be extended. HEEMSKERKAZ., supra note 32, at 42.
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During the parliamentary debates, most politicians supported the
government’s views.
260
However, Heemskerk Az., insisted that
societal interest required a continuation of patent law, because
inventions took time and capital and without patents, inventions either
would not take place or would be kept secret to protect the investments
made.
261
Other politicians contested this and argued that inventors
could keep their inventions secret even if patents were maintained.
262
Moreover, regardless of patents, industries would undoubtedly
continue to innovate, as it was in their own interest to improve their
businesses.
263
History showed that big inventions were made even
without patents and the number of inventions which the industries
produced also exceeded the number of patent grants by far.
264
This
implied that patents were not critical for big inventions and that small
inventions could do without them.
265
Heemskerk Az. further argued that patents were required to secure
a proper income for the inventor’s labour,
266
but others disputed that
patents were needed for this and contended that the prospect of
marketing their innovations first gave inventors enough financial
advances to compensate them.
267
Strikingly, the evidence that the two opposing camps put forward
to support their positions was largely anecdotal and argumentative.
268
260. See Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12,
at 1457–64, 1467–81 (De Bruyn Kops, Van Houten, Godefroi, Du Marchie van
Voorthuysen, Gefken and Lenting); Deliberations of the Senate on the Patent
Abolition Bill, supra note 218, at 344–46 (Fransen van de Putte, Messchert van
Vollenhoven and Cremers).
261. Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12, at
1460.
262. Id. at 1478 (De Bruyn Kops).
263. Final Report of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 235, at
1161.
264. Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12, at
1468–69 (Van Houten).
265. Id. at 1468–69 (Van Houten).
266. Id. at 1460.
267. Id. at 1468 (Van Houten).
268. The statistic table reproduced in this paper (Table 1) was essentially the only
empirical evidence used in the debate. Other empirical evidence, e.g. on whether
useful inventions would still take place if patents were abolished, was more difficult
to produce. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 59, at 709 (explaining that
drawing a comparison between inventions made in countries with and without patent
2019] PATENT ABOLITION 915
Particularly, the case of patentless Switzerland was a rich source of
debate.
269
Heemskerk Az. argued that there was no proof that the Swiss
could do without patent protection, since many Swiss inventors
obtained patents for their inventions abroad.
270
He further took
Switzerland for “a robber state”, as Swiss industries benefited from
the absence of patents to imitate foreign inventions, urging Parliament
not to cooperate to turn the Dutch industries into a “disloyal, immoral
industry of imitation”, too.
271
Other parliamentarians, however, observed that various foreign
companies moved to Switzerland to escape the difficulties caused by
patent laws in their home countries.
272
They also did not find it
immoral if, due to an abolition of patent law, Dutch industries were
permitted to imitate foreign inventions.
273
It would be robbery only if
someone’s property was infringed, but that was not the case where
inventions lacked property status.
274
By contrast, they believed that the
freedom to imitate had positive effects, as it offered a training-school
to educate the industries.
275
The Swiss textile industry, which initially
did not possess the necessary equipment, but after imitating foreign




Equally important was that most parliamentarians doubted that any
protection was impossible, because the latter countries held no records of inventions
and improvements thereof; and neither could anything be said about the usefulness
of inventions generally).
269. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 59, at 709.
270. Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12, at
1461.
271. Id. at 1475, 1480.
272. Id. at 1464 (De Bruyn Kops).
273. Id. at 1477–78.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1478.
276. Final Report of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 235, at
1161. But see Moser, supra note 16, at 1220–33 (arguing that the growth of the
textile industry in Switzerland can be explained by the fact that the textile industry
was largely a secrecy industry, as innovations of dye stuffs, in particular, “were
extremely difficult to reverse-engineer and therefore less dependent on patent
protection”).
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law could cure the intrinsic objections raised against patents.
277
Examples of patent laws existing in other countries, both with and
without a prior examination of patents, were considered to be
imperfect.
278
Prior examination was costly and placed a heavy
administrative burden on the state, while it still could not conclusively
establish that an invention was new.
279
In a system without prior
examination, on the other hand, patent applicants would a priori be
regarded as inventors.
280
This took all force out of the argument that
fairness required inventors to be rewarded through patents, as patents
were granted to the first applicant and not to the true inventor.
281
Or,
as Godefroi consequently queried: “if a Government is not in a
position to establish whether the claimant of a patent has a right to it,
can it be sanctioned that it blindly grants a right that vests a temporary
monopoly?”
282
The idea that constructing a good and efficient law of patents was
simply impossible convinced many politicians, even some who did
believe that inventors had a right in their inventions,
283
that there was
no alternative but to abolish patents. Politicians that stayed
unconvinced, however, maintained that abolishing patents was a step
backward and that the only way forward was to improve the law.
284
Yet, when they were asked to give evidence of how patent law could
277. Final Report of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 235, at
1161–62; Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12, at
1464, 1477 (De Bruyn Kops), 1471 (Godefroi).
278. See, e.g., Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 59, at 709–10;
Memorandum in Reply, supra note 222, at 338; Deliberations of the House on the
Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12, at 1480 (Minister Fock); Deliberations of the
Senate on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 218, at 346 (Minister Fock).
279. Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12, at
1463, 1477 (De Bruyn Kops), 1471, 1479 (Godefroi).
280. Id. at 1463 (De Bruyn Kops).
281. Id. at 1463 (De Bruyn Kops), 1468 (Van Houten), 1472 (Du Marchie van
Voorthuysen); see also Deliberations of the Senate on the Patent Abolition Bill,
supra note 218, at 345 (Fransen van de Putte).
282. Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12, at
1471.
283. Deliberations of the Senate on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 218, at
345 (Fransen van de Putte; Messchert van Vollenhove).
284. Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12, at
1458–59, 1476 (Van Zinnicq Bergmann), 1459, 1462, 1474 (Heemskerk Az.).
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be amended to accommodate the concerns expressed,
285
they failed to
provide any examples to support their position.
286
This backfired on
them, as it gave opponents of the patent system the ammunition they




A last important element that facilitated patent abolition in the
Netherlands was the arrival of the cabinet Van Bosse-Fock, which
practiced a liberal-economic policy.
288
From the very start of its
operations, Van Bosse said: “Our course is unmistakably a course of
progress”.
289
Amongst the liberal measures which this cabinet took
were the abolition of the stamp duty on printed matter and newspaper
advertisements; the introduction of uniform postage for letters sent
from anywhere in the Netherlands; the abolition of the death penalty;
and the reform of agriculture in the colonies.
290
The abolition of
patents fits neatly in the liberal-economic progress under the cabinet
Van Bosse-Fock.
291
Despite the progressive policy, some parliamentarians cautioned
that a Dutch patent abolition could meet international repercussions.
292
They feared that other countries would get displeased if Dutch law
285. Id. at 1468 (Van Houten), 1471, 1478–79 (Godefroi).
286. Id. at 1476, 1479–80 (Heemskerk Az.).
287. Interestingly, in the United Kingdom, a similar situation took place, but with
the exact opposite effect. See JOHNS, supra note 18, at 282 (observing that, when
MacFie and other patent opponents were asked to provide “empirical evidence of
actual hardship caused by patents”, they “failed to point to concrete, empirical
instances of either suppression or extortionate royalty demands. The antipatent case
suddenly seemed to rest on a rather abstract extrapolation from political-economic
theory”).
288. Den Hertog, supra note 17, at 29–30.
289. Regeling der Werkzaamheden, Bijblad tot de Nederlandsche Stcrt. 1867/68
II, 413 (Minister of Finance, Van Bosse, stating: “Onze rigting is bepaaldelijk eene
rigting van vooruitgang”).
290. P.J. OUD & J. BOSMANS, STAATKUNDIGE VORMGEVING IN NEDERLAND,
DEEL 1: 1840-1940 86–88 (11th rev. ed. 1997).
291. Den Hertog, supra note 17, at 29–30.
292. See, e.g., Deliberations of the Senate on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note
218, at 346 (urging Parliament to be cautious, as England had not yet abolished
patents, despite its large industries and free trade policy).
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permitted companies to imitate inventions patented abroad.
293
Moreover, they argued that if international law required the
Netherlands to protect patents, the law under consideration would
have to be withdrawn, which should better be prevented.
294
Other politicians did not understand how patent abolition could
cause international problems, as the Netherlands had full autonomy to
regulate this matter.
295
The most progressive ones maintained that it
would look favourably on the Netherlands to lead the battle against
patents.
296
Given the strong anti-patent movements in several other
industrialized countries,
297
the government also expected patent
abolition to create no international difficulties.
298
Minister Fock
concluded: “The Netherlands has followed many nations in abolishing
the tax on knowledge: let the Netherlands now be the first to introduce
the system of industrial freedom by abolishing patents. That is not an
act of reaction, but an act of progress on the way to free development
of the industries.”
299
The government, in fact, anticipated that many countries would
follow the Dutch example.
300
That was not without reason: the anti-
patent movement in Europe was so strong that it was to be expected
that other countries would follow suit.
301
However, in the early 1870s,
293. Final Report of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 235, at
1162; Senate Report on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 232, at 338.
294. Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12, at
1459 (Van Zinnicq Bergmann).
295. Deliberations of the Senate on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 218, at
345 (Fransen van de Putte).
296. Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12, at
1464 (De Bruyn Kops).
297. Memorandum in Reply, supra note 222, at 339. Whether the anti-patent
movement in Europe was in decline or fully alive was fiercely debated in Parliament.
See, e.g., Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12, at
1461–62, 1474 (Heemskerk Az.), 1470–71 (Godefroi) (both referring to foreign
legal authorities in support of their opposing positions).
298. Deliberations of the Senate on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 218, at
346 (Minister Fock).
299. Deliberations of the House on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 12, at
1473.
300. Deliberations of the Senate on the Patent Abolition Bill, supra note 218, at
346 (Minister Fock).
301. See, e.g., Correspondance, 1 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE
LÉGISLATION COMPARÉE 310, 311 (1869) (highlighting that should European
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the free-trade movement in Europe weakened as a result of a severe
economic depression, upon which the anti-patent sympathies in
Europe rather suddenly disappeared.
302
The Dutch patent abolition
thus remained an isolated case.
VII. CONCLUSION
From a contemporary perspective, the Dutch patent abolition can be
regarded as a pretty radical act and perhaps even as a revolt against the
established order. Back then, however, it seemed to be a logical step
to abolish patents, which were perceived as old remnants from the
privilege system standing in the way of industrial progress. The step
to actually remove patents was not taken lightly though. However, in
the Netherlands at the end of the 1860s, there were various persuading
factors that made the Dutch government decide that abolishing patents
was the right thing to do.
First, given the deep anti-patent sympathies in Europe in those days,
the Netherlands believed they had nothing less to expect than that
other nations would soon follow their example.
303
This shows that the
Dutch patent abolition unmistakably was an act of political
opportunism. Yet, as history reveals, the course of events changed so
abruptly that in the end no other country ventured to join the Dutch in
their patents abolition.
This change was not foreseeable by the Dutch government at the
time. Yet, the fact that the legislator assumed that the Netherlands
would not be alone in their endeavours clearly indicates that its
decision to abolish patents was not motivated by the thought to bring
the Netherlands economically back on par with other industrialized
countries, as is sometimes suggested in literature.
304
Obviously, while
the Dutch patent abolition had the effect of allowing Dutch industries
to freely imitate and use foreign inventions and technologies, it was
not inspired by the motive to turn the Netherlands into a robber state.
countries repeal their patent laws, the United States would certainly follow suit as
they would not permit themselves to have lesser liberties than other industrialized
countries).
302. SeeMachlup & Penrose, supra note 9, at 5–6.
303. See Janis, supra note 2.
304. See GERZON, supra note 14, at 6–8; VAN ENGELEN, supra note 14, at 152.
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As the parliamentary history shows, the decision to abolish patents
was not made overnight, but took roughly thirteen years.
305
Indeed, the
Dutch legislator acted consciously and cautiously not to upset
international affairs. However, as it expected other states to follow
suit, it was confident that its international relations would not be hurt.
Apart from an accommodating international political climate, the
home situation in the Netherlands also called for a radical change. In
fact, the Dutch patent law in place at the time was so bad that it only
seemed a small step for the legislator to abolish patents. Of course,
government could have also opted for a major patent reform, which it
clearly and deliberately considered, but because it found no good
example in any foreign patent law, it was convinced that there was no
other option but to abolish patents.
Additionally, the Dutch legislator’s mind-set was not yet infused
with a deep legal-theoretical (ideological or dogmatic) view on
patents, allowing it to adopt a pragmatic position towards the question
of patent abolition. The fact that it did not accept, neither as a matter
of principle nor as a matter of right, that inventors have pre-existing
rights in their inventions was a critical first step without which the case
for eliminating patents would have been much harder, if not
impossible, to make. As observed, this resulted in the adoption of an
economic-utilitarian approach bywhich the legislator evaluated patent
law against principles of utility and the public interest. This provided
sufficient arguments for the lawmaker to kill the patent system, as it
could not see how patents supported the true interests of the industries
and of the public at large.
This brings us to the last ingredient, namely the political economy
in the Netherlands in the late 1860s. As observed, the state of industrial
development in the Netherlands at the time was less established than
in neighbouring countries. In fact, industrialization in the Netherlands
began to set in only after 1860.
306
This explains why the Dutch patent
abolition met with little opposition from the industries. The
Netherlands knew very few, if any, patent-sensitive industries and
most Dutch industries would actually benefit from an absence of
305. See discussion supra Part V.
306. BRUGMANS, supra note 15, at 83.
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patents. So, with the arrival of the progressive cabinet Van Bosse-Fock
in 1868, which followed a liberal-economic course with a strong
accent on free trade, the time was right for the Dutch to finally
conclude the case for patent abolition.
Other than setting historical records straight, the question remains
what lessons this historical case study holds for current discourse.
What is striking about the Dutch case is that all the necessary
ingredients for a patent abolition were present in the Netherlands in
the late 1860s. It was a country in industrial development with a
progressive liberal-economic government, an international
accommodating environment, a malfunctioning patent law and a
strong movement in favour of patent abolition that faced little-to-no
opposition from the industries. Translating this to today’s reality, it is
questionable if we will ever witness another situation where all these
ingredients will so neatly coincide to allow a developed country to
abolish patents, as modern literature is calling for.
307
For one thing, there is no developed nation in the world where the
industries are not reliant on patents. So, if a country would raise the
issue of patent abolition, it is likely to attract fierce opposition. For
fear of harming their economies, therefore, governments will be less
susceptible to walk out on patents. In addition, the international world
order has changed so radically, that patent abolition is essentially
impossible. It would require governments to depart from international
patent treaties, including multi-lateral and bi-lateral trade-agreements
offering protection for patents. These did not yet exist in the 1860s.
308
Accordingly, the present-day situation is so entirely different that,
even if one would endorse the current calls for patent abolition, it
would be very difficult to talk any developed nation into eliminating
patents, unless perhaps by convincing multiple large industrial states
to take concerted action. However, a simultaneous patent abolition in
307. See generally BESSEN &MEURER, supra note 3; BOLDRIN& LEVINE, supra
note 3; JAFFE&LERNER, supra note 3; Boldrin & Levine, supra note 3; Hilaire-Pérez
et al., supra note 3; Kingston, supra note 3; Stallman, supra note 3.
308. Indeed, when taking the decision to abolish patents in 1869, the Netherlands
was not yet bound by international treaties. One reason why the Netherlands restored
patents in 1912 was the international pressure to that effect by parties to the 1883
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, to which the Netherlands
was one of the first signatories. RESIUS UITVINDING, supra note 217, at 33.
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several countries around the globe is unlikely to occur soon, if ever.
So it may very well be that the Dutch patent abolition will forever
remain an isolated case.
